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The Supreme Court first heard an Establishment Clause challenge to
the practice of legislative prayer over three decades ago in Marsh v.
Chambers.1 It has heard a second challenge this Term in Town of Greece v.
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1. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska
Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the
State).
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Galloway,2 but has not yet rendered a decision at the time of this
publication.
Between Marsh and Galloway, the Court has decided several cases
concerning other types of religious speech by government. This religious
speech includes nativity scenes and “Ten Commandments” shrines in town
halls and courthouses,3 the words “Under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance,4 the printing of “In God We Trust” on money,5 and so on.
The controversies surrounding this speech are highly charged. Yet the
actual litigation resulting from them puts relatively little at stake. The
religious-minority plaintiffs urge that they have been made to feel like
“outsiders in the political community.”6
This kind of stigmatic
harm,however genuine, rarely carries much independent weight in other
areas of the law.7 On the other hand, the government defendants cite what
Justice Scalia would call “the interest of the overwhelming majority of
2. See generally Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013)
(granting certiorari).
3. See generally Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Ch., 492 U.S. 573 (1989); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary
Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
4. See generally Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
5. See generally O’Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979); Gaylor v. United
States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
6. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[G]overnment endorsement or disapproval of religion . . . sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”);
see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S.
573, 595 (quoting Lynch); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10
(2000) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority
Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 155–56 (1996) (discussing how the experience of religious
minorities as political outsiders can be compared to the experiences of groups such as
feminists and racial minorities).
7. With limited exceptions, for instance, the law traditionally does not allow
collection for emotional distress in negligence suits without some showing of a physical
impact. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, Etc. § 12 (2013). When emotional distress is
inflicted intentionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the distress was “severe” and that the
behavior was “extreme and outrageous.” See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 1 (1985).
Similarly, sexual harassment claims premised on a hostile work environment theory rest on
mental distress, but require a showing that the harassment was severe. See 78 A.L.R. Fed.
252 (1986). Mental suffering is rarely considered as an element of damages in contract law.
See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 49 (2013). Also see infra at n. 200 (discussing failure of
equal protection claims based on emotional distress resulting from incorporation of
Confederate battle flag into official state insignia).
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religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a
people.”8 But even if we grant that giving God thanks and supplication as a
people feels different from giving thanks or supplication as a church or as a
family or as another private organization, that feeling is surely an “interest”
at least as abstract as the interest in “not feeling excluded,”9 and also of the
sort disfavored elsewhere in the law.10
The overall character of these cases is indeed so abstract that it tends
to boil down to a story of my indignation versus your indignation. The
important question—namely, whose indignation is more justified under the
circumstances—depends on what Justice O’Connor referred to as the
“judicial interpretation of social facts.” 11 These “social facts” are left out
of the hands of juries and are reviewable de novo on appeal.12 They
concern, among other things, what sort of message a town sends to an
“objective observer” when it installs a Ten Commandments monument
8. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
9. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
10. See Thomas Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the
Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1119 (2006). Professor Colby eloquently critiques Justice Scalia’s majoritarian logic by
substituting race for religion:
Imagine if this reasoning had been employed in Brown v. Board of Education:
In the context of segregation in public schools there are legitimate competing
interests: On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “inferior;”
but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of Kansans in being
able to educate their children in the presence of members of their own race
alone. Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.
What a sad Constitution that would be.
Id. at 1119.
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
12. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Adam
M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 135, 136 (2005) (“The reason for this allocation of power is not evident from
the nature of the test. Roughly speaking, the query is whether a reasonable observer would
think that the government sent a message favoring religion over non-religion. Context
matters, including the community setting. Juries regularly answer questions like this.
Negligence cases call for somewhat similar judgment. Even better, juries may determine
whether speech is so offensive to community standards that it qualifies as obscenity.”); see
also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n.3 (1995)
(plurality opinion) (asking as an aside whether it should be juries who decide these
questions).
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outside a Courthouse;13 whether a menorah is a religious or a secular
symbol;14 and how a nonobservant high schooler would feel during an
official prayer at a football game.15
The power of this fact finding to shape the outcome of a case almost
irrespective of the legal standard being applied stands as the one constant in
an area of law notorious for its caprice.16 The various theoretical constructs
advanced by the Justices—the government should not “endorse” religion;
should not “coerce” religious compliance; should act “neutrally”—give
little real guidance to lawyers. If the point of the law is to predict what the
judge will do with your case, as Holmes believed,17 then where the Justices
make real law is in their findings of social fact: a nativity scene
impermissibly endorses religion when it is placed in the “most beautiful”
part of a courthouse,18 but not if it is surrounded by reindeer;19 prayers at

13. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844, 862–63 (finding that there was a
predominantly religious purpose behind the Ten Commandments display); see also Van
Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (finding that the placement of a Ten Commandments
monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds was “far more passive” that its usage in other
cases and that the monument had a “dual significance” in being grouped with other
historical, non-religious monuments).
14. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613–21.
15. See Doe, 530 U.S. 290.
16. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Unpredictability of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine
in Establishment Clause Cases, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1439 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme
Court “has failed to adopt coherent principles of law governing the Establishment Clause”).
17. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 173 (1920) (describing the law as “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious. . .”).
18. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492
U.S. 573, 579–81, 594–602 (1989).
19. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (approvingly describing a
nativity scene’s surroundings: “a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candystriped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads
‘SEASONS GREETINGS,’ and the crèche at issue here”); see id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the nativity scene’s “features combine to make the
government’s display of the crèche in this particular physical setting no more an
endorsement of religion than such governmental ‘acknowledgments’ of religion as
legislative prayers . . .”); Joshua D. Zarrow, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment
Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477, 495
(1986) (describing Lynch as establishing a “two plastic reindeer rule”); Am. Jewish Cong. v.
City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 126 (7th Cir. 1987) (invalidating a nativity scene under
Lynch because “[i]n this case, . . . therefore, unlike Lynch, the secularized decorations in the
vicinity of the nativity scene were not clearly part of the same display”).
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graduation ceremonies coerce graduating students into participating;20 the
phrase “In God We Trust” has lost its religious meaning through rote
repetition.21 Analogy to these factual findings offers practitioners and
policymakers a far more reliable guide than any application of the Court’s
“tests.”
In this article, I discuss the Court’s attempts between Marsh and
Galloway to apply its tests to questions of governmental religious speech. I
begin in Part I with Marsh, which avoided tests altogether. Instead, Marsh
upheld legislative prayer based on its historical pedigree and its continuing
widespread practice.22
Marsh is in this respect an anomaly among the government religious
speech cases; later opinions, though they disagree on which test to apply, at
least purport to apply some test or another based on a larger understanding
of the Establishment Clause’s purposes. I discuss these tests in Part II. Yet
I argue that these tests have proven so pliable in the hands of Justices
willing to interpret the social facts creatively that Marsh, in its lawlessness,
emerges as less of an exception than it would appear.
In Part III I discuss Galloway, the upcoming legislative prayer case.
Galloway’s impact could easily be limited to the law of legislative prayer,
as the Court has for years treated legislative prayer, and Marsh, as a
jurisprudential island. But Galloway’s municipal defendants seem to have
angled for something larger—namely, a confrontation between test-free
Marsh and the “endorsement test,” which the courts currently consult to
decide most matters involving the constitutionality of government religious
speech. The “endorsement test,” which I explain below, is vulnerable on
the current Supreme Court, which may well take Galloway as an invitation
to bring it down. But more interestingly, Galloway may set the stage for a

20. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“The undeniable fact is that the
school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least,
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”).
21. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 41 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), for the suggestion that the
reference to God in the Pledge has “lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content,” concluding that “[a]ny religious freight the words may have been meant to carry
originally has long since been lost”).
22. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783–95 (upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of
opening legislative sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State).
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reassessment of Marsh’s exceptional status and an expansion of the case’s
permissive, test-free approach beyond legislative prayer.
I. The Marsh “Rule”
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is neither
clear nor predictable.23 Yet it has remained under the nominal control of
the same leading case for the last four decades. Lemon v. Kurtzman24 set
forth a three-pronged standard that the Court continues to apply today,
though somewhat grudgingly, and with frequent exceptions:25
1.

First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;

2. Second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits26 religion;
3. Finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.27
23. See Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535, 2535 (2012)
(explaining Justice Alito’s sentiment that the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
undoubtedly in need of clarity”); see also Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (decrying “an
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in shambles”).
24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing Lemon to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried . . . . It is there to scare us . . . when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to
return to the tomb at will.”); see also Marcia S. Alembik, The Future of the Lemon Test: A
Sweeter Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1184–85
(2006) (discussing the declining use of the Lemon test amid competing constructs).
26. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373, 1381, 1384 (1981). “The ‘inhibits’ language is at odds with the constitutional text and
with the Court’s own statements of the origins and purposes of [the] clause. Government
support for religion in an element of every establishment claim, just as a burden or
restriction on religion is an element of every free exercise claim. Regulation that burdens
religion, enacted because of the government’s general interest in regulation, is simply not
establishment.”
27. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. Lemon’s test has probably survived partially because its
terms are so malleable that they tend to avoid direct contradiction with countervailing
frameworks, and partially because there is no alternative framework robust enough to
command widespread support. Its banality inspires criticism. Yet banality may operate as a
survival mechanism in an area of law where tempers run high and clear standards are so hard
to articulate. Compare the proposed “actual legal coercion” standard of Justices Scalia and
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The Lemon test’s first two prongs carry over from a standard
articulated in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,28 a case
about Bible readings in public schools. There, the Court held that “to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.”29 The Court held that the fundamentally “religious character of
the exercise”30 trumped the School District’s assertion of “the promotion of
moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the
perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature”31 as secular
purposes and effects promoted by the Bible readings.
The Lemon test, as informed by Schempp, should have struck down the
legislative chaplaincy challenged in Marsh v. Chambers. For eighteen
years, Nebraska had retained Presbyterian minister Robert Palmer (not the
singer32) as chaplain for the legislature at a salary of $319.75 per month.33
Rev. Palmer offered a daily prayer at the outset of every legislative session.
For years, Rev. Palmer’s prayers had been explicitly Christian; but at the
request of a Jewish legislator, Rev. Palmer had altered the prayers to have a
Thomas. See Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It is difficult to see how
government practices that have nothing to do with creating or maintaining the sort of
coercive state establishment described above implicate the possible liberty interest of being
free from coercive state establishments.”); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty
”) (emphasis in original). The test, though capable of misapplication, provides an unusual
clarity in this area, but its results simply go too far politically.
28. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“The test
may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”) (emphasis added); see also
STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, ELLERY’S PROTEST: HOW ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRADITION AND
SPARKED THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER 326 (2010) (“The first two prongs of the test
had been set in Justice Clark’s opinion in Schempp; the third, “entanglement” prong was
added in Lemon.”)
29. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
30. Id. at 224.
31. Id. at 223.
32. If you are inclined to enter YouTube URLs manually into the address bar on your
browser, you can see the other Robert Palmer perform “Addicted to Love” here: “Robert
Palmer – Addicted to Love,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcATvu5f9vE. It really
holds up surprisingly well.
33. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785.
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“Judeo-Christian”34 flavor. The state published these prayers along with the
rest of the legislative record.
Lemon requires a secular purpose, a secular effect, and no excessive
entanglement. A secular purpose-and-effect for the prayer program can be
contrived fairly easily – namely, the prayers’ role in “solemnizing” the
occasion.35 Yet the undeniably “religious character of the exercise” should
have trumped the interest in solemnization, just as it had trumped the
secular purposes offered in Schempp to justify a Bible reading.36 Moreover,
the salary paid to Rev. Palmer, as well as the controversy wrought by the
prayers, would seem to offend the “entanglement” prong of the Lemon
test.37 Under Lemon, it is hard to see how legislative prayer survives.
But the majority of Chief Justice Burger’s Court apparently found this
result unacceptable. 38 We are left to ask why. Some of the opposition to
striking down legislative prayer was probably ideological; in the years since
the Warren Court decided Schempp 8-1 against the Bible readings, seven of
the Warren Court’s nine seats, including six of the Schempp majority, had
been replaced. Only Justice White voted to invalidate the Bible readings in
Schempp and to uphold Nebraska’s legislative chaplaincy in Marsh; he may
have had concerns about the Court’s image.39 But whatever the majority’s
34. Id. at 793. If “Judeo-Christian tradition” refers merely to the incorporation of
Jewish texts into Christianity, then it is worth asking why we do not hear more about a panAbrahamic “Judeo-Christian-Muslim-Baha’i tradition.” The answer is that anti-Semitism is
in postwar America taboo to a degree that anti-Islam and anti-Baha’i are not. “JudeoChristian” gives Christian conservatives a way to subordinate religious minorities while
avoiding the appearance of anti-Semitism. The notion of a “Judeo-Christian tradition”
nevertheless comes across as vaguely patronizing toward Jews whose faith does not
incorporate specifically Christian theology; the implication seems to be that Judaism itself is
a now-superseded step toward the development of Christianity. For an account of the
origins of “Judeo-Christian” theology that appears to have its origins in American postwar
politics, see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity
and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 277, 283–84 (2007).
35. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[L]egislative prayers . . . [and other] government acknowledgments of religion serve, in
the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”).
36. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 798–800.
38. Id. at 783.
39. While Schempp had aroused little controversy, it was largely because the Court
had already broached the issue of school prayer several years earlier in Engel v. Vitale.
Invalidating Nebraska’s chaplaincy in Marsh would have opened a new front in a perceived
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ideological or pragmatic motivations for upholding the chaplaincy, it could
not do so without either sidestepping or mangling Lemon and Schempp as a
matter of doctrine. Nor could the Court plausibly reconcile the chaplaincy
with either of the broader Establishment Clause models articulated in
previous cases—namely, a model of a “strict separation” between church
and state40 or, more liberally, a model requiring “neutrality”41 between
religion and non-religion. It may not even be possible to devise a “test” that
could accommodate the Establishment Clause to a practice that so closely
resembles a state-financed church service.
The majority opinion for Marsh therefore did not refer to Lemon, to
the neutrality doctrine, or to the doctrine of strict separation. Instead, it
upheld Nebraska’s chaplaincy “in the Judeo-Christian tradition” based
entirely on a long history—a revisionist one at that42—of legislative
chaplains past.43 The Chief Justice found evidence of legislative prayer in
Congress at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification to be particularly
persuasive evidence that the Founders could not have intended legislative
prayer to be unconstitutional.44 Yet the Chief Justice did not seem to make
judicial “war on religion,” just as Engel had some years before. See, Thomas C. Berg, The
Story of the School Prayer Decisions: Civil Religion Under Assault. FIRST AMENDMENT
STORIES 193 (Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman eds., 2011); Steven D. Smith,
Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38
PEPP. L. REV. 945, 959 (2011).
40. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
41. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The First
Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality.
The philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic—the nonbeliever—is entitled to go his own
way. The philosophy is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will be a divisive
force.”).
42. See Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1171 (2009).
43. The Chief Justice purported to rely on history as evidence of the drafters’ intent
rather than as a justification in itself for a long-standing practice: “Standing alone, historical
patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees, but there is far
more here than simply historical patterns. In this context, historical evidence sheds light not
only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they
thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress-their actions
reveal their intent. An act ‘passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution,
many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous
and weighty evidence of its true meaning.’” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (1983) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888)).
44. Id. at 787–88 (“[T]hree days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid
chaplains, final agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights. . . . Clearly the
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains
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an argument based entirely on the Framers’ intent, as he seems to argue that
the continuation of legislative prayer over the centuries has contributed to
the practice’s constitutionality: “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our
society.”45 It is seemingly the normalcy, the ordinariness of legislative
prayer that justifies the practice rather than adherence to existing
Establishment Clause principles..
And though competing principles of anti-proselytization and antisectarianism would later be drawn from the opinion,46 Marsh, taken on its
own, reads as a deliberate attempt to avoid applying a test.47 In that the
Lynch majority relies on it openly, the case represents the highwater mark
of the test-free, analogy-based approach.
Marsh in Lynch
Under thin doctrinal cover, Chief Justice Burger expanded the Marsh
approach in Lynch v. Donnelly, the first major nativity-scene case. In
Lynch, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island set up a lighted Christmas
display on a private space in a downtown shopping district. The display
contained a “talking” wishing well, a sit-on-Santa’s-lap setup, a miniature
“village” of houses and a church, some lighted stars, a sleigh and reindeer,
some garland, a “SEASON’S GREETINGS” sign, various cutouts
including a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot, and finally, a nativity scene.
Daniel Donnelly, the plaintiff, objected to what he saw as an alarming
mixture of church and state.48
and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment”).
45. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
46. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603–05 (the anti-sectarianism principle); id. at
659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (the antiproselytization principle). See also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95 (“The content of the prayer
is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity
has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.”).
47. Avoiding tests seems to be a defense mechanism that kicked in when Chief Justice
felt doctrinally cornered. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), a freespeech case in which the Chief Justice avoids referring to a fairly recently-decided
controlling opinion, and instead offers an ad hoc analysis in order to reach a result the
controlling test would not have reached.
48. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–72.
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Lynch, unlike Marsh, at least purported to apply a test, namely that of
Lemon.49 Yet in Lynch’s application of Lemon, the Chief Justice created
something even more freewheeling than Marsh. In answering Lemon’s
question whether the nativity scene’s “principal or primary effect is to
advance or inhibit religion,”50 the Chief Justice simply catalogued a broad
range of government religious speech practices and asserted that the
“effect” of Pawtucket’s nativity scene surely could not be any worse than
the “effects” of any of those:
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the crèche is to
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would require
that we view it as more beneficial to and more an endorsement of
religion, for example, than expenditure of large sums of public money
for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students attending
church-sponsored schools, expenditure of public funds for transportation
of students to church-sponsored schools, federal grants for college
buildings of church-sponsored institutions of higher education
combining secular and religious education, noncategorical grants to
church-sponsored colleges and universities, and the tax exemptions for
church properties. . . .51

As in Marsh, the analysis is long on analogical reasoning that serves
only to move the process of justification offstage. But in Marsh, the Chief
Justice at least drew from the history of the particular practice under
challenge, namely legislative prayer. In Lynch, on the other hand, he drew
from a diffuse anthology of church-state comminglings none of which
closely resembled Lynch.52 Indeed, the Chief Justice failed to make any
“suggestion that publicly financed and supported displays of Christmas
crèches are supported by a record of widespread, undeviating acceptance
that extends throughout our history.”53
The Chief Justice made only a nominal effort to address the remaining
two elements of Lynch: he found legitimate secular purposes for a Christian
nativity scene in the city’s desire to “celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that Holiday.”54 He also cited the low market value of the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 679.
Id.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681–82 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 681.

416

20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405 (2014)

nativity scene and the lack of governmental “contact with church
authorities” as evidence that church-state entanglement was minimal.55
Normalcy Checking
The Burger approach in Marsh and Lynch is what I call a “normalcy
check.” To determine whether a governmental practice offends the
establishment clause, a normalcy check asks, “Is this governmental practice
really any different from putting ‘In God We Trust’ on the money?” “Is this
governmental practice really any different paying a minister from state
funds to perform a benediction at the opening of every session of the
legislature, day in and day out?” More broadly, “Is this governmental
practice a normal thing for the government to do, or not?” Such questions,
of course, are designed to avoid the direct application of actual legal
principles to the practice under consideration. This makes normalcy checks
easy to disparage. Yet it also makes them hard to quit, as the post-Lynch
case law shows.
To be fair, “normalcy checking” is my epithet, not a name that Chief
Justice Burger chose to describe his own doctrine. Then again, Marsh v.
Chambers does not articulate any other doctrine. The opinion says so little
about its methods that the reader is left to reverse-engineer its operative
principle. And that principle appears to be that an apparent normalcy
ratifies a governmental practice—at least in the area of governmental
speech on religion. If the practice is widespread, that helps. If the practice
is old, that helps. If examples of the practice date to the founding era, even
better.
Such reasoning is more likely to appeal to a member of the religious
majority than to a member of a religious minority. For the simple fact is
that acts of government religious speech will more likely reflect the
preferences of the voting majority, and generally speaking, membership in
the voting majority is more likely than not to consist mainly of members of
the religious majority. And if the religious majority adds up to a
supermajority, then members of the religious majority will almost always
constitute a majority of the voting majority.56 For instance, Christians

55. Id. at 684.
56. Granted, this rule weakens in three-way races in which no candidate receives a
majority. I also assume, perhaps imperfectly, that the voting population reflects the religious
population demographically.
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constituted eighty-two percent of Nebraskans in 2008.57 (This does not
include any of the sixteen percent who describe themselves as
unaffiliated,58 the large majority of whom probably come from a
background more Christian than any alternative faith.) If everyone in the
state voted in an election, and if every non-Christian in the state voted for a
candidate who won with just over fifty percent of the vote, then Christians
would still make up sixty-eight percent of that candidate’s voting base.
To the extent that religious background determines an observer’s
instincts about church-state propriety, then, it is little wonder that there
exists such a long tradition of Christian ministry in the Nebraska
legislature—after all, there has never existed any non-Christian majority
voting bloc, and there is therefore little political will to take on this
relatively minor annoyance.59 An unchallenged practice, over time, grows
into a “long tradition,” establishing a political baseline that the majority of
Nebraskans feel comfortable with and regard as normal. But this comfort
level reflects the size of the Christian majority, not the satisfaction of the
non-Christian minority.
By adopting normalcy as the de facto index of legitimacy, the Chief
Justice simply weighs legislative prayer against the long-standing religious
majority’s sense of propriety. To be fair, the Chief Justice, in Lynch at
least, cited a lack of past “controversy” regarding the long tradition as
evidence of support among some broad consensus, presumably including
members of the non-Christian minority.60 Perhaps in Marsh he would have
taken into account failed legislative challenges to these practices had they
occurred. But no one should take it as a surprise that this is not an area
where the non-Christians of Nebraska would waste their scarce political
57. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY 100 (2008).
58. Id.
59. Cf. Lund, supra note 42.
60. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684. Justice Breyer, as well, emphasized a lack of controversy
surrounding a long-standing Ten Commandments installation in Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 679 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (controlling opinion) (“The determinative
factor here, however, is that 40 years passed in which the monument's presence, legally
speaking, went unchallenged. . . . Those 40 years suggest . . . that few individuals, whatever
their belief systems, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in any
significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to establish religion.”). Compare
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct 1803, 1817 (2010) (discussing cross meant to commemorate
World War I) (“Time also has played its role. The cross had stood on Sunrise Rock for
nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted. By then, the cross and the cause it
commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness.”).
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resources.
Nor should anyone discount the possibility of serious
indignation on the part of religious minorities—after all, litigation threats to
governmental religious speech reliably produce a huge political outcry from
members of the Christian religious majority that supports them, and
incumbent politicians reliably take these controversies as can’t-be-missed
opportunities to pander to the faithful.61 If the numbers justified it,
members of “other religions” would speak every bit as loudly on these
issues. The fact is that the normalcy checking simply does not attempt to
account for minority religious adherents’ sense of what is normal.
The Court would later apply various more formal analyses to the
problem of state religious speech. Few later Justices would perform an
61. In Freedom From Religion Foundation v. City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686 (6th Cir.
2013), for instance, an atheist organization petitioned the mayor of a Detroit suburb for the
removal of a nativity scene from a “Winter Welcome” display in the city’s civic center. The
mayor refused the petition, and the atheist organization instead sued, unsuccessfully, for the
right to place its own atheist display alongside the nativity scene. Id. at 690. The Mayor
made political hay of the issue with a public letter to the atheist organization: “[O]ur country
was founded upon basic religious beliefs. The President takes the oath of office on the Holy
Bible. . . . We have a whole host of other religious traditions in government situations at all
levels. . . . Everyone has a right to believe or not believe in a particular belief system, but no
organization has the right to disparage the beliefs of many Warren and U.S. citizens because
of their beliefs. . . . Your non-religion is not a recognized religion. Please don't hide behind
the cloak of non-religion as an excuse to abuse other recognized religions.” Id. at 691. The
Mayor also took the message to the airwaves: “Everyone has a right to freedom of religion,
but I do not believe our Founding Fathers felt there should be a right to attack religion or a
freedom from religion.” See Jeff T. Wattrick, Warren Mayor Jim Fouts, Freedom from
Religion Coalition’s [sic] Fight over Nativity Display is a Holiday Buzzkill, MLIVE.COM
(Dec. 21, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/12/warren_
mayor_jim_fouts_freedom.html. In Texas, to take another example, Governor Rick Perry
recently signed into law the protection of the salutation “Merry Christmas,” despite any
realistic threat of litigation over the phrase. See Texas Gov. Perry signs ‘Merry Christmas’
bill into law, FOXNEWS.COM (June 14, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/
14/perry-signs-merry-christmas-bill-into-law/. And then, of course, there is the story of
Judge Roy Moore of Alabama, who, as a Circuit Judge, displayed the Ten Commandments
behind the bench and opened court sessions with prayer. He vowed to defy a judicial order
to remove the plaque, and received much media attention. Conservative groups “drafted”
Moore to run for election to the Alabama Supreme Court. Moore ran and won. There,
Moore commissioned a two-and-a-half ton Ten Commandments monument for the Supreme
Court’s rotunda. The Eleventh Circuit ordered the monument removed, Glassroth v. Moore,
335 F.3d 1282 (2003). Moore defied the order and was removed from office. See Jannell
McGrew, Moore Suspended, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Aug. 23, 2003). Moore then spun
the controversy into two unsuccessful runs for Alabama’s governorship, and was finally reelected Chief Justice of the state’s Supreme Court in 2012. Kim Chandler, ‘10
Commandments judge’ Roy Moore wins his old job back, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 8,
2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-08/national/35505358_1_republicanmoore-roy-moore-chief-justice.

THE LAWLESS RULE OF THE NORM

419

analysis as testless as Chief Justice Burger’s in Marsh or Lynch. Yet in
many ways, the normalcy checks of Marsh and Lynch express the spirit of
the case law better than any of the ostensibly more principled analyses that
have followed them. Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test,” discussed
below, offers judges—or at least judges not bound by the Supreme Court’s
past constitutional factfinding—near-total discretion to find facts. But its
chief competitor, Justice Kennedy’s anti-coercion doctrine, is sufficiently
malleable to accommodate essentially whatever outcome a judge prefers.
II. The Endorsement Era
Endorsement’s Origin
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch attempted to supply a
bit of the particularity that the Chief Justice Burger’s analysis lacked. To
this end, Justice O’Connor focused the antiestablishment question on
whether Pawtucket had “endorsed Christianity by its display of the
crèche.”62 Endorsement of religion, she explained, “sends a message to
non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.”63 As such,
endorsements of religion violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition
against “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s
standing in the political community.”64 She then adapted the first two
prongs of Lemon—secular legislative purpose, effect of the action—to this
question of endorsement.
To pass constitutional challenge, the
government’s actual purpose must not be “to endorse or disapprove of
religion,” and the effect must not be “in fact [to] convey[] a message of
endorsement or disapproval.”65
This Lemon test modified by the
endorsement test went on to dominate future litigation over public displays
of religious symbols.
Whatever the theoretical shortcomings of an analysis that places so
much constitutional weight on purely emotional harms, Justice O’Connor’s
adaptation of Lemon did promise the Court’s unlawyerly jurisprudence a bit
62.
63.
64.
65.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 690.
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of badly-needed structure. It also promised a compassionate attitude
toward the experience of minority religious groups.
Yet Justice O’Connor’s application of her own endorsement test, even
in its debut, disappoints on both counts. In determining whether
Pawtucket’s actual purpose was to endorse religion, for instance, Justice
O’Connor wrote that “[t]he evident purpose of including the crèche in the
larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the crèche but
celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols”66—a
watery word salad that if anything has less coherence than the Chief
Justice’s similar reasoning that “ to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that Holiday”67 somehow constitute “legitimate secular
purposes.”68
Justice O’Connor’s argument assumes that the “religious content of
the crèche”69 can be filtered from its non-religious “content” and, with the
trial court, that Christmas can be divided into a secular holiday and a
religious holiday. Under this division, the religious Christmas consists of
everything involving the baby Jesus, his associates, and his environs, and
the secular Christmas consists of the remainder, including garland, candy
canes, gift giving, and all aspects of the Santa Claus phenomenon.70 But
even if we accept this division (there is reason to doubt, for instance, that
Santa Claus is a wholly secular symbol71), surely everyone can agree that
the nativity scene, at least, counts as a religious rather than a secular
66. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 681(majority opinion).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
70. The trial court wrote that “the courts . . . have recognized the obvious fact that
Christmas, as celebrated in 20th century America, has a decidedly secular dimension. This
is the Christmas whose central figure is Santa Claus and whose themes are the
nontheological ones of goodwill, generosity, peace, and less exaltedly, commercialism. Yet
it is equally obvious that for the many 20th century Americans who practice Christianity,
there is another Christmas. This is the “original” Christmas whose central figure is Christ,
the Son of God, and whose themes are the essentially theological ones of salvation and
spiritual peace, renewal, and fulfillment.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1163
(aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (rev’d 460 U.S. 1080 (1983))). In this, the court agreed
with the plaintiff Donnelly, who “stated that he does not consider Santa Claus and the
Christmas tree to be religious symbols because, unlike the nativity scene, they are not
referred to or described in religious documents such as the Bible . . . . He distinguished it
from the other decorations on grounds that the crèche ‘attempted to tell a complete story in
itself-the story of the birth of Christ.’” Id. at 1156.
71. See infra n. 112.
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symbol. The intuitive conclusion is the one that the trial court reached:
namely, that the public display of a nativity scene, a core religious symbol,
has to offend the Lemon test.72
Not for Justice O’Connor. For her, the nativity scene was included to
not to promote the “religious content of the crèche” but to further the
“celebration of a public holiday through its traditional symbols.”73 But
what is meant by “traditional symbols”? Presumably, by “traditional
symbols,” Justice O’Connor meant all of the symbols on display. Yet it is
not clear how the inclusion of the crèche assists any “traditional symbol”
besides the crèche. A nativity scene does not enhance the celebratory effect
of an inflatable Santa, for instance. It would seem, then, that the purpose of
the crèche is to further the celebration of a public holiday through the
crèche. This is just a circular way of expressing Chief Justice Burger’s ipse
dixit that “[t]he display is sponsored by the City to celebrate the Holiday
and to depict the origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular
purposes. The District Court's inference, drawn from the religious nature of
the crèche, that the City has no secular purpose was, on this record, clearly
erroneous.”74
As for the second prong of the endorsement test, namely, whether the
symbol “in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval,”75
Justice O’Connor again resorted to a normalcy check. Although the crèche
had “religious and indeed sectarian significance,” wrote Justice O’Connor,
“the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to
be the purpose of the display – as a typical museum setting, though not
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any
message of endorsement of that content.”76 The crèche, Justice O’Connor
wrote, should not be considered in isolation, but in context. The question,
in context, is “what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
display.” Justice O’Connor’s answer—that the nativity scene is not offered
as an endorsement of Christianity but as an enhancement of a secular
72. The First Circuit affirmed but applied a strict scrutiny standard borrowed from
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), which had come down since the trial court disposed
of the case. Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1094.
73. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The evident purpose of
including the crèche in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the
crèche but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols.”).
74. Id. at 681 (majority opinion).
75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 692.
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holiday celebration—does not come from the ample evidence of what
Pawtucket residents did understand to be the purpose of the display:
namely, to “keep Christ in Christmas.”77 Instead, the answer is supplied by
a normalcy check:
“[T]he government’s display of the crèche in this particular setting [is]
no more an endorsement of religion than such governmental
‘acknowledgements’ of religion as legislative prayers of the type
approved in Marsh v. Chambers, governmental declaration of
Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of “In God We Trust” on
coins, and opening court sessions with ‘God save the United States and
this honorable court.’ Those government acknowledgements of religion
serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate
secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence
in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history and
ubiquity, those practices are not understood [by whom?] as conveying
government approval of particular religious beliefs.”78

Peer through the hazy, pretextual “secular” public purposes, and it
becomes clear that the real question in Lynch, for Justice O’Connor just as
much as for the Chief Justice, was this: is this particular governmental
invocation of religious symbolism – namely, the nativity scene - worse than
anything we already do? Worse than “In God We Trust” on money? Is this
normal?79
77. The trial court, Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1161, discussed letters to this effect that
were addressed to the mayor’s office: “Although about 10% of the letters expressed the view
that the nativity scene represented simply the general moral and ethical aspirations of
goodwill, peace, and love, the clear majority of writers regarded the dispute over the nativity
scene as implicating religious beliefs and values. The Mayor's insistence on preserving the
crèche was lauded by many as a determination to “keep Christ in Christmas” and, more
broadly, to keep God in American life. Several letters decrying the loss of a City “tradition”
indicated that their writers viewed the crèche’s central role as portraying the religious aspect
of Christmas. Some writers perceived the lawsuit as a confrontation between believers,
whose right to express their faith was being threatened, and nonbelievers. In several letters,
the writer expressed abhorrence for “the minority's” attempt to dictate to the “majority” what
symbols could be displayed and revered. Some advocated allowing taxpayers or voters to
decide how the City should spend their money. A few vigorously contested the desirability
or even the possibility, of separating the religious and political spheres.” Id.
78. Id. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
79. Cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 421, 437 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“The point for
decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Our
system at the federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such
financing. Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it
takes.”).
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Endorsement in Maturity
By the next time that the court heard a nativity scene case in Allegheny
County v. ACLU, a majority of the Court had at least acknowledged Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test.80 The Endorsement test reached its mature
form outside the school setting in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,81 Van
Orden v. Perry,82 and McCreary County v. ACLU.83 Allegheny County, a
second nativity-scene case, offered a counterpoint to Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement analysis in Lynch. Unlike in Lynch, where the nativity scene
was accompanied by all sorts of dazzling distractions such as candy canes
and elephants, the nativity scene in Allegheny stood alone on the courthouse
steps, allegedly the “most beautiful” part of the courthouse, and was said to
signify a more explicit, and therefore unconstitutional, endorsement of the
Christian story.84 Meanwhile, the Allegheny County Court upheld the
display of a giant menorah; because it was accompanied by a Christmas
tree, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that the menorah in
context served as just one component in a display with the secular purpose
of celebrating pluralism and, to borrow the County’s impossibly corny
phrase, “saluting liberty.”85
Van Orden and McCreary County, companion cases decided sixteen
years later, together make a similar point in the decidedly silly “Ten
80. In School Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), Justice
Brennan’s majority opinion held that a labor-sharing program between public and parochial
schools had the impermissible effect of endorsing religion. In Witters v. Washington Dep’t.
of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), an aid-to-parochial schools case, Justice
Marshall upheld the program, discussing endorsement as one of a few potential
Establishment Clause pitfalls that the state of Washington had avoided. In Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Justice Brennan’s majority opinion found an impermissible
purpose “to endorse a particular religious doctrine” in a Louisiana statute requiring any
public-school instruction on the theory of evolution to be accompanied by a discussion of the
pseudo-scientific, pseudo-religious theory of “creation science,” and Justice Scalia’s dissent
did not take issue with the use of endorsement as a criterion for determining advancement
and legislative purpose. The endorsement test played a fairly small role in these cases,
though, which could have been decided the same way under the pre-endorsement, preLemon school prayer decisions of Engel and Schempp, as well as the post-Lemon school
religious display case of Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) and various other aid-toschool cases applying a confused but unmodified Lemon test.
81. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
82. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
83. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
84. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573.
85. Id. at 613–21.
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Commandments” context.86 In each case, a municipality had installed a
Ten Commandments plaque outside a courthouse. In McCreary County,
the plaque stood more or less alone in a position of prominence not unlike
that of the nativity scene in Allegheny County.87 The County itself had
rolled out the monument to great fanfare,88 and after initially running into
litigation trouble, had supplemented the Ten Commandments a
“Foundations of American Law and Government” display: a fig leaf meant
to suggest, absurdly, 89 that the Ten Commandments were being honored
86. Ten Commandments installations have been placed at courthouses for decades.
Many of the monuments originated in the 1940’s when E.J. Ruegemer, a Minnesota juvenile
court judge, sought to post paper copies of the Ten Commandments in juvenile courts
throughout the country as a source of guidance for youths in trouble. The Fraternal Order of
Eagles (“FOE”) worked with “representatives of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism”
to reach what they believed was a nonsectarian version of the Decalogue. Cecil B. DeMille,
director of the film “The Ten Commandments,” took an interest in FOE’s project and
suggested that, instead of paper, FOE distribute Decalogues engraved on bronze plaques.
FOE revised the proposal to granite, and local chapters began donating the plaques to their
communities. Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2000). The flurry of
litigation surrounding them is relatively recent. Activist groups have found two lines of
attack in these cases. First they have argued that the installation of the monuments amounts
to a governmental establishment of religion in violation of the establishment clause. Second,
they have argued that the installations violate Free Speech Clause case law: by permitting
private speakers to install the Decalogues, the argument goes, the state created a forum that
must be opened to competing points of view. See Blake R. Bertagna, The Government’s Ten
Commandments: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and the Government Speech Doctine, 58
DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2009).
87. See McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. at 851–
52.
88. Id.
89. It bears noting how little merit there is to the claim that the Ten Commandments
are foundational legal documents.
The First Amendment prevents the first two
commandments – “thou shalt have not other gods before me” and “thou shalt not make to
thyself any graven images” – from becoming law because they are establishments of
religion. As for “thou shalt not take the lord’s name in vain,” that is also bad law. “Honor
thy father and mother” is bad law. “Thou shalt not covet” is bad law, though to be fair, the
subject matter cannot be legislated. So four of the commandments have no analogue in
American law. There are two commandments that the American law observes fairly strictly
– “thou shalt not kill” and “thou shalt not steal.” A third – thou shalt not bear false witness –
is enforced in some contexts (perjury, defamation) but not others (teaching of false doctrine).
But these three prohibitions are preconditions for the possibility of civilized life. They are
too universal and obvious to have “originated” with any particular source or group of
sources. It is not as if God laid down the rule against perpetuities. This leaves two
commandments – “remember the Sabbath day” and “thou shalt not commit adultery.” Each
of these propositions receives some limited recognition at law, yet it is possible to imagine a
society that did not follow them at all. Perhaps – perhaps – Sabbath laws and adultery laws
can fairly be described as Moses’ bequest to American law. But to call them a “Foundation

THE LAWLESS RULE OF THE NORM

425

not for their religious significance, but for their centrality to American legal
culture.90 If anything, though, this revision cemented further the message
that Christianity and American law function as a unit. The Court held that
the display unconstitutionally endorsed religion.91
In Van Orden, on the other hand, the Ten Commandments plaque was
presented with various displays commemorating the traditions of founding
settlers in the area. As with the Allegheny County menorah, the Court held
the plaque’s religious significance had been offset by an historical
message.92
These three opinions - the majority opinions in Allegheny County and
McCreary County and Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion in Van Orden93 set the style of the endorsement era. There is, first of all, an obsession with
aesthetics, semiotics, and “context.” These themes appeared only dimly in
Justice O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence, in which she offhandedly compared
the Pawtucket holiday display and its nativity scene to a governmentfunded “museum setting” containing a single work of religiously-themed
art;94 the exposition in Allegheny County, McCreary County, and Van
Orden, for better or more likely for worse, is far more elaborate.
Second, the post-Lynch endorsement opinions filter these aesthetic
considerations though various reasonable-person analyses. The Justices
dispute this reasonable person’s perceptions bitterly. Indeed, the Justices
treat the reasonable person so territorially that the construct comes across
less as a guide for judicial discretion than as a customizable avatar of
judicial notice.
Meanwhile, dissenting opinions and disgruntled concurrences fall into
two broad furrows. In the first are Justices who favor an endorsement test
that would do more to advance the interests of nonadherents. Justices
of American Law and Government” is generous.
90. Id. at 870–71.
91. Id. at 881.
92. Judge Posner praises Justice Breyer’s work in McCreary/Van Orden as
pragmatically concerned with the politics of judicial intervention. While in Van Orden the
Ten Commandments plaque had stood for decades without prior conflict, the McCreary
display was a recent provocation. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 99–102 (2005). Perhaps a status quo rule concerned with deterring
aggressors in the wars of church and state would be best. Indeed, by denying talking points
to religious fanatics, such a rule may in some sense serve the stated ends of the endorsement
test better than the endorsement test itself would.
93. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Stevens and Brennan, when they were still on the Court, wrote from this
angle fairly reliably. Justice Stevens, in particular, seemed to use the
endorsement test as a vehicle for the separationist model of religious
freedom that has mostly gone by the wayside in the past three decades.95
Judges in the opposite camp urge the rejection of the
Lemon/endorsement framework. Nearly everyone in this camp has written
on the subject: Kennedy, White, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Alito. With
substantial justification, these Justices deride the endorsement test for its
general lack of clarity. They also express some justified skepticism that
constitutional doctrine should rest so heavily on personal offense. And with
less justification, they take opportunities to question the validity of that
offense.
Yet in search of a purpose behind all of these controversial public
displays, the accomodationist Justices conjure up policy interests every bit
as vague and emotionally-based as those of the endorsement test. The
government’s decision between adopting religious imagery is typically
portrayed as a choice between “acknowledgement” of religion, on the one
hand, and “hostility” toward religion, on the other. A religiously-themed
display, the argument goes, reflects only an “acknowledgment” of religion,
which – who can deny it? – has always played a prominent role in
American history. Given the importance of religion to so many people, a
judicial “extirpation” of religion in government96 would send a message of
“hostility”97 or “callous indifference”98 toward religion. This concern with
95. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Fixture on a Changing Court: Justice Stevens and the
Establishment Clause, 106 Nw. U.L. REV. 587 (2012). It is not clear who on the present
Court might pick up Stevens’ cause following his retirement. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor have signed on to Justice Stevens’ opinions in these cases before. Justice Breyer
has rejected strict separationism. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (“[T]he Establishment Clause
does not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes
of the religious.”). Justice Kagan has not yet weighed in on these issues.
96. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 316 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does
not require extirpation of all expression of religious belief.”); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at
657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Taken to its logical extreme, some of the language [in earlier
Court opinions] would require a relentless extirpation of all contact between government and
religion.”).
97. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683–84 (“This case, like all Establishment
Clause challenges, presents us with the difficulty of respecting both faces. Our institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not press religious observances
upon their citizens. One face looks to the past in acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage,
while the other looks to the present in demanding a separation between church and state.
Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a
division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the
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distressed sensibilities, of course, calls to mind the endorsement test’s
strained attribution of Constitutional weight to emotional harms.
In short, the case law of governmental religious speech contains more
complexity than it did under Marsh. Yet its major contours of a) context
analysis, b) reasonableness analysis, and c) the supposed dilemma of
acknowledgment versus hostility do nothing to tame the role of normalcy
checking. They simply obscure it. The case law of the past three decades
has not replaced Chief Justice Burger’s normalcy check so much as broken
it up into smaller pieces and reassembled it into a more jagged form.
The Role of Secular Context Objects
Aside from Marsh, which relies entirely on “history and tradition,” all
of the case law in the government religious speech cases rests on the truism
that a symbol’s meaning varies with its context. And context does matter,
even if its ability to dilute the meaning of potent religious imagery is
frequently overstated.99 Nonetheless, the question of context is so factspecific that there is almost always a plausible argument that a given
traditionally religious symbol has either retained its religious meaning or
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage”). See also Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–314 (1952) (Warning that the Constitution does not contain “a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. . . . [W]e
find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to
religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence.”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–846
(1995) (there is a “risk [of] fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could
undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires”).
98. See, e.g., Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 90 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“If the government may
not accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly neutral and noncoercive
manner, the “benevolent neutrality” that we have long considered the correct constitutional
standard will quickly translate into the “callous indifference” that the Court has consistently
held the Establishment Clause does not require.”); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 658 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).
99. Even a cross is capable of being presented detachedly or ironically in art. But it
takes a strong, unambiguous cue to remove the message of endorsement that is attached to it.
Presenting one of these marks in a museum or a textbook is perhaps the surest means of
detaching the presenter from the mark’s ordinary meaning of endorsement. Thus, Justice
O’Connor in Lynch and Allegheny County, voting to uphold public nativity scenes,
compared the towns’ holiday displays to museums. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring). I think that
comparison is a stretch. But see Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette 515 U.S. 753, 770–72
(Thomas, J., concurring) (offering that a cross under the care of the Ku Klux Klan loses its
religious meaning).
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taken on a secular one in light of its placement relative to context objects
that are said to be unquestionably secular. This is especially true in cases
involving physical objects, where judges microanalyze in writing the
positioning and size of these symbols relative to each other. Courts have
squabbled notoriously considerations such as the placement of a nativity
scene in the “most beautiful” part of a courthouse100 and about the
likelihood that a viewer in a speeding car would have time to apprehend
that a cross by the side of the road was a memorial for a state trooper.101
Judge Easterbrook once remarked that this sort of analysis was better cut
out for interior designers: “all a judge can do is announce his gestalt.”102
But there is a similar dynamic in cases that do not involve the
placement of tangible objects. In Elk Grove United School Dist. v.
Newdow,103 the Ninth Circuit had held that the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance,104 recited by schoolchildren in public schools,
impermissibly endorsed religion.105 Such a conclusion is hard to avoid.
Congress inserted the words into the previously existing Pledge in 1954; the
bill’s sponsor in declared that the phrase’s purpose was “to contrast this
country’s belief in God with the Soviet Union’s embrace of atheism.”106
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court avoided the Establishment

100. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 579–81, 594–602.
101. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 20 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), in which Justice Thomas sums up the a
dispute among judges of the lower court in Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095
(10th Cir. 2010) (cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n., 132 S. Ct. at 12): “According to
the panel, because the observer would be ‘driving by one of the memorial crosses at 55–plus
miles per hour,’ he would not see the fallen officer's biographical information, but he would
see that the ‘cross conspicuously bears the imprimatur of a state entity . . . and is found
primarily on public land.’ According to the dissenters, on the other hand, if the traveling
observer could see the police insignia on the cross, he should also see the much larger name,
rank, and badge number of the fallen officer emblazoned above it. The dissenters would
also have employed an observer who was able to pull over and view the crosses more
thoroughly and would have allowed their observer to view four of the memorials located on
side-streets with lower speed limits.” Id. (citations omitted).
102. Am. Jewish Cong., 827 F.2d at 126.
103. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
104. “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands: one Nation
indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.” J. BAER, THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE: A
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1892–1992, p. 3 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F. 3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2003) (rev’d sub nom. Elk
Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004)).
106. 100 Cong. Rec. 1700 (1954).
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Clause issue by deciding the case on standing grounds.107 But Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas all wrote concurrences in
the judgment that would have upheld the “under God” language on the
merits. Both the Rehnquist and O’Connor opinions express variations on
the theme that proximity to “patriotic” language neutralizes the ordinarily
religious significance of the “one Nation under God” phrase.108
Aside from the question of proximity is the question of whether the
context objects are themselves secular. This question precedes analytically
the question of whether the relationship between the secular object and the
religious object dilutes the religious object’s ordinary meaning, and the
opportunity it presents for factfinding is less noticeable.109 In both Lynch
and Allegheny County, for instance, the Court agreed unanimously that
certain components of the Christmas display were, at least if they stood
alone,110 secular symbols. Everyone on the Court reasoned that neither
Christmas trees nor candy canes nor Santa Claus had more than a tenuous
relationship with the Christmas holiday’s biblical origins. These became
the secular context objects, and the nativity scenes’ meanings depended on
their association with them.
Yet an adherent to a non-Christian faith likely would not have seen
things the same way as the entirely Christian Lynch and Allegheny courts;
notably, Lynch and Allegheny were decided at a time when no Jewish
justices sat on the Supreme Court’s bench.111 Identifying Santa and
107. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
108. See id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 33
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
109. The point of a secular reference object is that no one would dispute its secularity
because the object is so obviously secular. Yet precisely because secular reference objects
are thought by the Justices to be obviously secular, the Justices seem not to take seriously
the possibility that someone else might find the objects to have a religious significance.
110. In Allegheny, Justices Stevens and Brennan both held that the Christmas tree was
sometimes secular, but was lent religious meaning by an accompanying menorah. See Cnty.
of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 638–43
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 654 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Interestingly, though, both Stevens and
Brennan held that the menorah was always religious. Id. at 643–44 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. When Justice Fortas vacated what was widely perceived as the “Jewish seat” on
the Court, President Nixon replaced him with Justice Blackmun, a Protestant, leaving the
Court entirely Christian for the first time since the appointment of Justice Brandeis by
President Wilson in 1916. The Court lacked Jewish representation until President Clinton’s
appointment of Justice Ginsburg in 1993. See Christine L. Nemacheck, Have Faith in Your
Nominee? The Role of Candidate Religious Beliefs in Supreme Court Selection Politics, 56
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Christmas trees as secular makes some intuitive sense from a Christian
perspective, as the lack of theological content in the Santa myth means that
the least religious Christians, or perhaps former Christians who no longer
believe in Christ, might completely take the Christ out of their own
personal Christmas while leaving the Santa in place. In a community
without any other religious group besides Christians, chances are that even
the least religious people in the community tell their children about Santa.
But in a community with a substantial minority-religious population, for
instance, many of the most observant people will refuse to participate in
Santa culture precisely because of their religion.112 The Court is correct
that many non-Christians find ways to participate in Christmas;113 but even
so, Santa culture still tracks religious identification too closely to be cleaved
so neatly from religion itself.114
DRAKE L. REV. 705, 715–16 (2008).
112. For accounts of varied and often awkward experiences of Jews during the
Christmas season, see Jennifer Steinhauer, At One Jewish Home, Making Room for Santa,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/us/
20santa.html (describing the controversy surrounding a family’s Christmas-themed display
in a largely Orthodox Jewish neighborhood).
113. See Rabbi Michael Leo Samuel, Book Review: A Kosher Christmas: ‘Tis the
Season to Be Jewish, TEMPLE BETH SHALOM, available at http://www.bethshalom
temple.com/book-review-a-kosher-christmas-tis-the-season-to-be-jewish/ (last visited Nov.
15, 2013) (describing complicatedness of being Jewish at Christmastime) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
114. In the following discussion, Justice Blackmun attempts to holiday of Chanukah
into its secular and religious components. Readers from Christian backgrounds (included)
may see more easily in this passage than in writings about Christmas the awkwardness of
characterizing a holiday as partially secular by reference to a dichotomy between “religious”
and “cultural” tokens. “The cultural significance of Chanukah varies with the setting in
which the holiday is celebrated. . . . In this country, the tradition of giving Chanukah gelt has
taken on greater importance because of the temporal proximity of Chanukah to Christmas.
Indeed, some have suggested that the proximity of Christmas accounts for the social
prominence of Chanukah in this country. Whatever the reason, Chanukah is observed by
American Jews to an extent greater than its religious importance would indicate: in the
hierarchy of Jewish holidays, Chanukah ranks fairly low in religious significance. This
socially heightened status of Chanukah reflects its cultural or secular dimension.” Cnty. of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 585–87. But all of this begs the question: if Christmas could be
celebrated as a secular winter holiday, then why would American Jews have needed to
elevate Chanukah’s status so that it could serve as a Jewish alternative? The truth is that
even the allegedly “secular dimensions” of Christmas are still sectarian enough that when
Justice Kagan was able to make a good joke about it during her confirmation hearing. When
asked where she was on Christmas Day, 2009, she responded that “like all Jews, [she] was
probably in a Chinese restaurant.” Warren Richey, Elena Kagan Shows off Sense of Humor
in Confirmation Hearings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 20, 2010, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0630/Elena-Kagan-shows-off-sense-of-
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There is a similar majoritarian bias at work in the assumption that
praise in the tradition of an ecumenical “civil religion” can at some point
become a secular practice through rote repetition.115 These instances of
“ceremonial deism” become, in a broad sense, the stock secular reference
objects for government religious speech generally. Language such as
“under God” is considered broadly inclusive, notwithstanding the
population of Americans who practice polytheistic religions, nontheistic
religions, or no religion. And though I do not mean to suggest with this
observation that the Supreme Court’s unanimously Judeo-Christian
religious background absolutely determines its jurisprudence of government
religious speech—surely judges are just as capable as anyone else of seeing
things from someone else’s point of view—I also do not wish to downplay
the influence of religious and cultural experience on ideology. Indeed,
research suggests that even on the almost entirely Judeo-Christian federal
bench, judges from more majoritarian religious backgrounds (Protestant,
Catholic) are likelier to defer to the government in religious liberty cases
than judges from relatively minoritarian religious backgrounds (Jewish,
unconventional Christian faith).116 It is hard to imagine that a hypothetical
judiciary composed mainly of atheists would take government defendants’
sham assertions of secular purpose—for instance, that a prayer before a
football game is necessary to solemnize the occasion117—nearly as
frequently as our more religiously-mainstream Supreme Court does.
The Role of the Reasonableness Inquiry
The endorsement test asks whether an instance of government
religious speech would make the nonadherent observer feel like an outsider
in the political community, and whether the viewer would see the
government’s purpose as the endorsement of religion. Such questions can

humor-in-confirmation-hearings. The notion that Christmas is in any easy sense a secular
holiday, makes much more sense in a homogeneously Christian community than in a diverse
one.
115. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the “one Nation under God” language in the Pledge of Allegiance has “lost through rote
repetition any significant religious content”).
116. See Gregory C. Sisk et. al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An
Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004).
117. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306 (2000).
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only be answered at the highest possible level of generalization: namely, a
reasonable-person test.
This is not necessarily a problem. The law frequently devises
boundary concepts – “reasonableness,” “good faith,” “best efforts,” to
regulate questions the law must decide even though it cannot possibly
articulate a clear standard.118 The law could scarcely operate without this
final backstop of reasonableness.119 Yet reasonable person standards pose
problems in cases that revolve in one way or another around political,
socioeconomic, or demographic categories—race, gender, class, and so on.
If the question is how a reasonable person would interpret the word
“airplane,” for instance, it probably makes little difference whether you ask
a reasonable man or a reasonable woman. If the question is what a
reasonable person would perceive to be a hostile work environment in a
sexual harassment case, on the other hand, the gender of the reasonable
person makes a lot of difference.120 The government religious speech cases
raise similar issues because of the rough correspondence between ideology
and religious background.121
118. As I observed above, the reasonable person inquiry regulates mixed questions of
law and fact that do not lend themselves to clearly-articulable standards. Among these, the
questions implicated in the government religious speech cases have such a strong political
character that they do not seem to lend themselves well to any sort of legal analysis.
119. For instance, the law cannot possibly enumerate every possible instance of
negligence in advance.
The reasonable person—the highest possible level of
generalization—is the only standard capable of discerning which acts fall below the standard
of care and which do not. To take another instance, there must be a consistent way to
interpret contracts. Yet even if it were possible for some sort of code to give highly specific
rules for interpretation, the interpretation of the interpretive code would itself call for the
application of a metainterpretive code, and so on ad infinitum until someone ended the
misery, asking, “could we just ask what a reasonable person would say about this?”
120. If the question is whether a reasonable observer would find probable cause in the
fact that a teenager ran in the opposite direction when the police showed up, for instance, the
socioeconomic background of the reasonable observer makes a lot of difference. See Adam
B. Wolf, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence in Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 711, 715–22 (2000). Similarly, if the
question is what constitutes a hostile work environment, the gender of the reasonable
observer makes a lot of difference. The Ninth Circuit has analyzed such cases under a
“reasonable woman” standard since 1991. See e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879–80
(9th Cir. 1991). See generally Elizabeth Schoenfelt, Allison Maue & JoAnn Nelson,
Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter? 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 633, 651–54 (2002); Jacqueline M. Jordan, Note, Little Red Reasonable Woman
and the Big Bad Bully: Expansion of Title VII and the Larger Problem of Workplace Abuse,
13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 621 (2007).
121. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul
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In Lynch, Justice O’Connor was concerned with the possibility that the
state might “send a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community.”122 This concern for nonadherents
might suggest that the endorsement test’s author would be conscious of
reasonableness inquiries’ potential for reinforcing majority biases. Yet
Justice O’Connor never framed her reasonableness inquiry in terms of the
“reasonable nonadherent,” despite urgings from colleagues and
commentators that she should.123 Instead, she grappled with justices who
favored a more scrutinizing endorsement analysis over the weight that
should be given to existence of an offended “casual passerby.”124
Indeed, it has not been entirely clear over the course of the
endorsement test’s history whether even the reasonable adherent’s
viewpoint should be taken into account when a “misperception” occurs. In
Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, seven members of the court held that
actual perceptions of reasonable people do not matter if they are either
misinformed or not unusually well-informed. In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan
petitioned the state of Ohio for the right to display a large Roman cross
outside the Ohio statehouse. The area was designated by state law as a
public forum “for use by the public . . . for free discussion of public
questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose.”125 The case law
holds, roughly, that when a government opens government property to “free
of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO
ST. L. J. 491, 502 (2004) (“Jewish judges along with judges from non-mainstream Christian
backgrounds were significantly more likely to approve of judicial intervention to overturn
the decisions or actions of the political branch that either refused to accommodate religious
dissenters or provided an official imprimatur upon a religious practice or symbol . . . .”).
122. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
123. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799–800
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is especially important to take account of the perspective
of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious belief it expresses. A
paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect such a person from being made
to feel like an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community. If a
reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of religion from a private
display, then the State may not allow its property to be used as a forum for that display. No
less stringent rule can adequately protect nonadherents from a well-grounded perception that
their sovereign supports a faith to which they do not subscribe.”); see also Paula Abrams,
The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and Endorsement of Religion, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1542–43 (2010) (“If inclusion is a ‘paramount’ Establishment Clause
value, the critical perspective must certainly be that of the nonadherent.”).
124. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
125. Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4-02(A) (1994).
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discussion,” it forfeits the right to exercise content-based editorial
discretion over the speech that occurs there; instead, any content-based
regulation of the speech occurring in the forum must pass strict scrutiny.126
Yet the Board’s counsel advised it that allowing the Klan to display the
cross would create a reasonable perception that Ohio was endorsing
Christianity. The Board therefore denied the Klan’s application, reasoning
that “compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest
sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.”127
But the Supreme Court held that displaying the cross did not present
any actual danger of conflict with antiestablishment principles, given that
the state had not sponsored the cross, but rather had been forced to accept it
for legal reasons. From here, the seven-justice majority split into two
pluralities. Justice Scalia, writing for Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
Thomas, wrote that even if the reasonable observer perceived an
endorsement of religion in the Klan’s display of the cross on public
property, that perception should not count if it was in fact a misperception.
Justice O’Connor disputed this point—even misperceptions of endorsement
should invalidate a law, she insisted, if the misperceptions are
reasonable128—while straining to maintain that the reasonable observer
would not have perceived an endorsement of religion in the display of a
giant white cross in front of the Ohio State House. “[T]he reasonable
observer in the endorsement inquiry,” she wrote, “must be deemed aware of
the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears . . . [T]he reasonable observer would view the Klan’s cross
display fully aware that Capitol Square is a public space in which a
multiplicity of groups, both secular and religious, engage in expressive
conduct.”129 Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, by comparison, would have
regarded the inference of a religious message “normal.”130
126. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761.
127. Id. at 761–62.
128. See id. at 776–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“[W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing
religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid”) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 780, 782.
130. See id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“That the State may have granted a variety
of groups permission to engage in uncensored expressive activities in front of the capitol
building does not, in my opinion, qualify or contradict the normal inference of endorsement
that the reasonable observer would draw from the unattended, freestanding sign or
symbol.”); see also id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We confront here, as Justices
O'CONNOR and SOUTER point out, a large Latin cross that stood alone and unattended in
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Justice Scalia disfavors the endorsement test as a measure of
establishment clause validity, and his interpretation of the endorsement test
in Pinette is best understood as an attempt to define it away. If, as Justice
Scalia contends, a misperception by the reasonable observer should shortcircuit the application of the endorsement test, then the endorsement test’s
jurisdiction is narrow. Whether an observer has accurately perceived or
instead has misperceived an endorsement of religion on the part of the
government boils down to the question of whether government has in fact
endorsed religion, which, as I have argued above, is ultimately a question of
judicial “gestalt.”131 A judge determined to uphold an instance of
government religious speech, or perhaps determined simply not to apply the
endorsement test, can always find a “misperception,” even if a lower court
has not.
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Pinette, like her concurrence
in Lynch, puts very little actual distance on the opinion it concurs with. In
Justice O’Connor’s view, the endorsement test still applies whether or not
the reasonable observer has perceived endorsement accurately or not. Yet
her reasonable person must be so well-informed that it is hard to see how
the misperception could have occurred in the first place. In real terms, the
“misinformed” observer loses under either the Scalia or the O’Connor view;
the difference merely being that Justice O’Connor would have called the
result a result of the endorsement test, and Justice Scalia would not. Read
uncharitably, Justice O’Connor’s Pinette concurrence appears more
concerned with the maintaining the endorsement test’s leading position in
the field than with any actual difference the test might make in any
particular case.
The endorsement test’s detractors—given more space below—have
run with the possibilities created by Pinette. In Good News Club v. Milford
Central Schools,132 a religious club sought to hold meetings on the grounds
of a public school after hours. The school was placed in roughly the same
close proximity to Ohio's Statehouse. Near the stationary cross were the government's flags
and the government's statues. No human speaker was present to disassociate the religious
symbol from the State. No other private display was in sight. No plainly visible sign
informed the public that the cross belonged to the Klan and that Ohio's government did not
endorse the display's message. If the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to
uncouple government from church a State may not permit, and a court may not order, a
display of this character.”) (citations omitted).
131. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 126 (7th Cir. 1987).
132. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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dilemma faced by the state of Ohio in Pinette: it could risk violating the
speech rights of the group by denying it access, or it could risk creating a
perception of endorsement by extending support to the group. The school
chose to deny the group access. The Supreme Court denied the school
summary judgment: “We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do,
under the assumption that any risk that small children would perceive
endorsement should counsel in favor of excluding the Club’s religious
activity. We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a
modified heckler’s veto, in which a group’s religious activity can be
proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience
might misperceive.”133
The Etiquette of Acknowledgment and Hostility
Throughout the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Justices fret over the possibility that the government might, by not
“acknowledging” religion, express a message of “hostility” toward it.134
This theme predates the era of endorsement. In Schempp, for instance,
while voting to strike down Bible readings in a public school, Justice
Goldberg, concurring, writes that:
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality [toward religion] can
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the
Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such
results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to
me, are prohibited by it.
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance
of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God
and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive
historically from religious teachings. Government must inevitably take
cognizance of the existence of religion and, indeed, under certain
circumstances the First Amendment may require that it do so.135

133. Id. at 119.
134. See e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
135. Id. at 306. The “brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular” line is quoted
frequently by Justices who would uphold various government religious practices.
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In Wallace v. Jaffree,136 Chief Justice Burger expressed similar
concerns. An Alabama statute had allowed a daily moment of silence in
schools for “meditation.” The Alabama legislature amended the state to
permit “meditation or prayer.” The Supreme Court invalidated the
amendment.137 The Chief Justice responded in dissent that “[t]o suggest
that a moment-of-silence statute that includes the word ‘prayer’
unconstitutionally endorses religion, while one that simply provides for a
moment of silence does not, manifests not neutrality but hostility toward
religion. For decades our opinions have stated that hostility toward any
religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden by the Constitution as
is an official establishment of religion.”138 Incredibly, Chief Justice Burger
seems to argue not only that adding the word “prayer” to the statute was
permissible, but that removing the word “prayer” from the statute would be
unconstitutional! “[S]uch hostility,” he wrote in Lynch, would bring us into
“war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.”139
Justice Kennedy speaks a good deal more carefully than the Chief
Justice, but in a concur/dissent in the Allegheny County holiday-display
case, he cautions that:
[r]ather than requiring government to avoid any action that
acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits
government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the
central role religion plays in our society. Any approach less sensitive to
our heritage would border on latent hostility toward religion, as it
would require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge
only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the detriment of the
religious.140

It is ironic that Justices so concerned with messages of “hostility” and
an image of “callous indifference” toward religion do not show more
136. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
137. See id. The majority held that the “or prayer” amendment had no secular purpose
and was thus invalid under Lemon. See id. at 67. Justice O’Connor concurred in the
judgment, offering that the case should have been decided under the endorsement test. She
would have held that “the purpose and likely effect of this subsequent enactment is to
endorse and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools.” (O’Connor, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (citation omitted).
140. Allegheny Cnty., 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
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enthusiasm for the endorsement test. After all, the endorsement test
prohibits not only governmental messages endorsing religion, but those
sending messages of disapproval as well. The “disapproval” half of the
endorsement formula seems to answer some of the Justices’ concerns about
“hostility.” The test could just as easily have been called the “endorsement
or disapproval” test. Of course, governmental action that sends a message
outrightly disapproving of religion is a rarer thing than governmental action
that sends a message of endorsement, so it is no wonder that most of the
litigation concerns the “endorsement” half of the “endorsement or
disapproval” formula. One could almost imagine the Court refusing to
order the removal of some religious icon from a public place on grounds
that the Court would itself violate the “endorsement or disapproval” test by
issuing an injunction.
Yet it is easy to see why Justices upholding government religious
speech do not rely on the endorsement test in doing so. It would be
redundant. A judge who wants to uphold a practice under an Establishment
Clause challenge only needs to show that the practice being challenged
does not itself violate the Establishment Clause. Arguing at the meta-level
that the judge risked committing an Establishment Clause violation would
add nothing to the analysis. And in the process, it would enhance the
position of the endorsement test, which is all downside for judges who are
inclined to uphold government religious speech.
And of course, partaking fully in the endorsement test would mean
affirming the endorsement test’s uncertain premise that the Constitution is
sensitive to emotional offense. That idea, as I have written above, runs
against the grain of much of the common law, and its weakness tends to
embarrass arguments against government religious speech. On this front,
the supporters of government religious speech have the high ground against
their opponents, and they have no reason to give it up. Thus Justice
Kennedy, on the rare occasions that he has voted to invalidate government
religious speech, has bent over backwards to avoid writing an endorsement
test analysis. An endorsement theory would seem the most natural rationale
to invalidate prayer at public high school graduations and football games,
for instance. Yet in Lee v. Weisman,141 Justice Kennedy invalidated those
practices based on a relatively hard-to-sell theory that social pressures
rendered the prayers coercive,142 and in Santa Fe Independent School
141.
142.

505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 591–99.
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District v. Doe,143 he signed on to an opinion advancing the same theory
under a still-more tenuous set of circumstances.
Justices inclined to uphold government religious speech have little to
gain from exploiting the endorsement test’s stated prohibition on
“disapproval of religion.” Therefore they have not adopted a “disapproval”
test explicitly, and they are unlikely to do so. Yet they dabble in the
rhetoric of “hostility,” “callous indifference,” and “acknowledgement” of
religion in order to attach a policy backing to an otherwise ambivalentsounding legal argument.
The word “acknowledgement” has served as a particularly useful tool
for accomodationists. It can mean two things. At the weak extreme, it
means acknowledging the fact that there are people in the world who
practice religion. At the strong extreme, it means “acknowledging” the
verity of religious claims. The Justices indulge the strong sense of
“acknowledgment” more often than they should. Justices O’Connor and
Rehnquist both would have held in Newdow, for instance, that the words
“one Nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance are not religious but
“merely descriptive.”144
More commonly, though, the Justices exploit the word’s vagueness,
inviting the reader to interpret the term as referring to the social reality of
religion while leveraging the term in support of practices that endorse the
theological reality of religion.145 There is a reductio ad absurdum: “your
proposed rule (whatever it may be) implies that the government cannot
even acknowledge religion.” And sure enough, it would indeed be absurd
to hold that government cannot even admit that people practice religion.
But that sort of practice—Justice O’Connor’s “museum setting”146 comes to
mind—is never under challenge. Instead, the Court hears cases involving
143. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
144. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O’Connor,
J., concurring). See also Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion) (“Recognition of
the role of God in our Nation's heritage has also been reflected in our decisions.”).
145. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 99
(2005). Posner stated:
Whether God has actually played a role in the nation's history is a theological
question, the answer to which depends first on whether there is a God and, if so,
whether He intervenes in the life of nations. It is odd for the Supreme Court to
offer answers to these questions. But perhaps all that the Chief Justice meant by
‘God’ was invocations of God and all that he meant by ‘heritage’ was the
national culture.
146. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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strong-sense “acknowledgements”—prayers, for instance—the kind of
thing you are less likely to hear in Justice O’Connor’s “museum setting”
than in church.
Ultimately, the question of what is “hostile” to religion and what
“acknowledges” religion is subject to the same majoritarian “normalcy
check” analysis as the other big questions. Long-held practices favorable to
the religious majority set the baseline. Reinforcement of the baseline is
“acknowledgment;” withdrawal from the baseline is “hostility.”
The perennial “war on Christmas” debate captures this fairly well: in
communities traditionally composed almost entirely of Christians, “Merry
Christmas” is the traditional wintertime greeting. Because it departs from
“normalcy,” the lexical shift toward the “happy holidays” greeting has
inspired paranoia about governmental hostility – indeed, a state of “war” –
against Christianity. The state of Texas was recently moved to protect the
endangered “Merry Christmas” greeting by statute, despite an utter absence
of litigation or governmental action against the phrase.147
The bar for “hostility” against minority religions, meanwhile, appears
considerably higher. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n,148 for instance, a majority of the Supreme Court upheld against Free
Exercise challenge the United States Forest Service’s plan to build a road
through and remove timber from Native American sacred lands, despite the
Ninth Circuit’s finding “that the proposed government operations would
virtually destroy the . . . Indians’ ability to practice their religion.”149
Indeed, the court held it was unnecessary for the government to
demonstrate a compelling purpose, as the “governmental action [would not]
penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the
rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”150

147. See Texas Gov. Perry signs ‘Merry Christmas’ bill into law, FOXNEWS.COM (June
14, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/14/perry-signs-merry-christmas-billinto-law/.
148. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
149. Id. at 464 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d
688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986) rev’d sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988) (emphasis added)).
150. Id. at 449.
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The Coercion Test and the Prospects for Town of Greece v. Galloway
Despite its controversial status, the endorsement test has dominated the
government religious speech cases since Allegheny County. From
Allegheny County until Justice O’Connor’s retirement in 2005, the test
enjoyed the support of five justices: Justice O’Connor plus whichever four
justices comprised the Court’s “left wing.” When Justice O’Connor retired
in 2005, most court-watchers assumed that the endorsement test had met its
end. The right-leaning Justice Alito had taken her seat, and Justice
Kennedy replaced her as the Court’s ideological fulcrum.
Justice Kennedy has disdained the endorsement test as overly “hostile”
since Allegheny County. He wrote:
Taken to its logical extreme, some of the [endorsement test] language
quoted above would require a relentless extirpation of all contact
between government and religion. But that is not the history or the
purpose of the Establishment Clause. Government policies of
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an
accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.151

As an alternative, Justice Kennedy has advanced a more modest limit on
governmental “accommodation” of religion:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact “establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” 152

Under his analysis:
The crèche and the menorah are purely passive symbols of religious
holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by these
displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they
are free to do when they disagree with any other form of government
speech. There is no realistic risk that the crèche and the menorah
represent an effort to proselytize or are otherwise the first step down the
road to an establishment of religion.153

151. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
153. Id. at 664 (footnote omitted).
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The “coercion test,” stated as such, would seem to permit all
government religious speech. But Justice Kennedy’s discipline falters even
in the Allegheny County opinion, where he concedes that “the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall” could violate the
establishment clause under a coercion analysis.154 “This is not because
government speech about religion is per se suspect,” he says, “but because
such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the
government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a
particular religion.”155 But this is hard to reconcile with Justice Kennedy’s
defense of the nativity scene and menorah to the effect that passersby are
“free to ignore [the displays], or even turn their backs.”156 Surely they
could turn their backs on the large Latin cross, permanent or not.157 The
Latin cross hypothetical does not so much come across as an application of
the coercion principle as an application of Justice Holmes’ “puke test:” an
act of government “violates the Constitution if and only if it makes you
want to throw up.”158 Rather than refine the coercion principle, it seems to
create an exception to it.
But the Latin cross hypothetical has proved prophetic, as the one time
that the Court has actually decided a case under the coercion principle, it
has used the coercion principle to invalidate government religious speech in
circumstances that are at least arguably less coercive than in the Latin cross
hypothetical. The case is Lee v. Weisman,159 in which a public school
district hired a rabbi to conduct an allegedly “nondenominational” prayer at
a high school graduation. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, urged
that the prayer would have put “psychological coercion” onto attending
students that was tantamount to coerced religious practice. Here, too,
Justice Kennedy held that psychological pressures created a coercive
atmosphere. And without drafting an opinion, Justice Kennedy signed on
to Justice Stevens’ endorsement analysis in the similar Santa Fe
Independent School Dist. v. Doe,160 which invalidated student-led
invocations at football games.
154. Id. at 661.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 651.
157. See Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal
Inculcation, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 417, 431–32 (2009).
158. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
159. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
160. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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On their plain terms, the endorsement test and the coercion test offer
radically different approaches to the problem of government religious
speech. One would expect that all government religious speech would
survive under a coercion approach, and sure enough, it does in the opinions
of the Court’s “right wing.”161 Justice Thomas, in particular, has argued for
an “actual legal coercion” standard that would ignore mere psychological
pressures.162 One would also expect a great deal of government religious
speech to be invalidated under an endorsement approach, and sure enough,
the Court’s “left wing” has written opinions that would do so.163 But
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have presented visions of endorsement and
coercion that, while opposed in principle, can hardly be distinguished. If
unspoken peer pressure is grist for the coercion mill and “One Nation
Under God” is not a religious endorsement (but rather “merely
descriptive”), then there is little difference between a coercion test and an
endorsement test. Each is occasionally concerned with feelings of
exclusion and marginalization but ultimately with normalcy. It takes work
to stretch the coercion test to cover the same area as the endorsement test,
and it takes work to squeeze the endorsement test into the same small space
the coercion test would intuitively occupy. But the work can be done at the
expense of some credibility, as Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have
demonstrated. Each test is pliable enough to accommodate a wide range of
outcomes.
This is not to suggest that tests are completely irrelevant; it is harder to
justify government religious speech under endorsement than under
coercion, and harder to justify invalidating government religious speech
under coercion than endorsement. A judge forced to decide a case under
anticoercion principles is likely to reach a different result than under
antiendorsement principles. But no one on the Supreme Court is forced to
apply one test or the other. There is no possibility of review, and the grip of
stare decisis, especially in this conflicted area of the law, is tenuous.
Supreme Court Justices do not appear so much to apply principles in the
government religious speech cases as vote for outcomes, and they adopt the
161. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Van
Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (plurality opinion).
162. See James A. Campbell, Newdow Calls for A New Day in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas's “Actual Legal Coercion” Standard Provides the Necessary
Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 541 (2006) (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 737 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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theoretical framework that will embarrass their voting record least over the
long run.
The endorsement test governed as long as Justice O’Connor sat at the
center because four Justices to her left could be counted on to support a
more stringent form of the test. Similarly, Justice Kennedy since 2005 can
count on four Justices to his left to support a more stringent form of the
coercion test one that does not count psychological pressures as coercive.
Yet from 2005 until now, the Court has not decided any government
religious speech case on its Establishment Clause merits.164
III. Galloway
At the time of publication, the Court has not announced an opinion in
Town of Greece v. Galloway, its second legislative prayer case, and the
Justices’ remarks at oral argument offered few clues as to what they might
do.165
Since 1999, the Town of Greece has held a prayer at the opening of
each Town Board meeting. These prayers have been led on a rotating
“chaplain of the month” basis. Though the town has no formal policy
controlling eligibility for chaplaincy or the content of prayers, and though
the candidates for the chaplaincy were at least initially drawn randomly
from a list of faith leaders in the community, the vast majority of “chaplains
of the month” have been Christians. All of the chaplains between 1999 and
2007, in fact, were Christians invited by the Town to perform the service.
Though the Town insists that non-Christians and even atheists may request
a chaplaincy, it was only in 2008, after the plaintiffs in Galloway began to
complain of discrimination against non-Christians, that the Town invited
the first non-Christian chaplains to lead the prayer.166 It is this, the
164. In Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004), the Court disposed of the plaintiff’s claim on a
standing theory. In Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), the Court
decided the case under the Free Speech Clause.
165. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Town of Greece v. Galloway, __ S.Ct. __
(2013) (No. 12-696) [hereinafter Galloway Transcript].
166. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 2388 (U.S. May 20, 2013) (No. 12-696). The Court stated:
A Wiccan priestess and the chairman of the local Baha’i congregation each
delivered one of these prayers, and a lay Jewish man delivered the remaining
two. The town invited the Wiccan priestess and the lay Jewish man after they
inquired about delivering prayers; it appears that the town invited the Baha'i
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overwhelmingly Christian nature of the prayers, that distinguishes prayers
in Galloway from the “Judeo-Christian” Marsh prayers.167 “Roughly twothirds” of the prayers “contained references to ‘Jesus Christ,’ ‘Jesus,’ ‘Your
Son,’ or the ‘Holy Spirit.’”168
Marsh approves at least some “Judeo-Christian” legislative
chaplaincies. But it is not clear how much further Marsh goes. The
history-and-tradition rationale—at least assuming that we accept Marsh’s
history—would seem to suggest that almost anything goes. But Chief
Justice Burger clouds this with his remark in Marsh that “[t]he content of
the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication
that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance
any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”169 That careless aside
shapes Marsh’s entire holding without bothering to explain itself. Assume
that we can say what it would mean for a “prayer opportunity” to
“proselytize.” Then what is meant by “advance,” as distinguished from
“proselytize?” Does it mean the same thing as “advance” in the Lemon
formula with its prohibition against impermissibly “advanc[ing] [or]
inhibit[ing]”170 religion? Or is “advance” offered as the opposite of
“disparage?” And what is the significance of the word “exploited?” Does
it imply that Marsh is concerned with illicit proselytizing purposes, but not
proselytizing effects?171
chairman without receiving such an inquiry. However, between January 2009
and June 2010, when the record closed, all the prayer-givers were once again
invited Christian clergy.
167. The plaintiffs initially argued that the Town had intentionally discriminated
against non-Christians, but abandoned that argument after the trial court dismissed a claim
based on it.
168. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 24.
169. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–95 (1983) (emphasis added).
170. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citations omitted).
171. And as an aside, assuming that exploitation of the prayer opportunity does occur,
what happens next? Chief Justice Burger’s language implies that there may be a second
stage of the analysis. To expand the quotation, he wrote, “[t]he content of the prayer is not
of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has
been exploited . . . . That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95 (emphasis added).
Does this imply that if a court does detect “exploitation,” it may then move on to a second
stage of the analysis involving a “sensitive evaluation” and a “content-parsing?” I cannot
imagine that the Chief Justice intended something so needlessly complex; nonetheless, the
fact that the text even allows this interpretive possibility is testimony to Marsh’s surprisingly
unworkmanlike drafting.
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Allegheny County interpreted the Chief Justice’s language to mean that
“[h]owever history may affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian
references to religion by the government, history cannot legitimate practices
that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect or
creed.”172 The Court in Allegheny County reasoned that the Marsh prayers
had satisfied the Establishment Clause only “because the particular chaplain
had ‘removed all references to Christ.’”173 A number of circuits have taken
Marsh by way of Allegheny County to imply a requirement that legislative
prayer be “nonsectarian.” But the concept only makes so much sense.
Robert Palmer’s “Judeo-Christian” prayers may not have favored Judaism
over Christianity or vice versa, but they nonetheless seem to have favored
both Judaism and Christianity over other faiths. And, at any rate, as the
Supreme Court has noted elsewhere, it creates a sort of an establishment of
religion for a government to permit nondenominational prayers without
permitting denominational ones. On this basis, neither the district court nor
the Second Circuit in Galloway agreed with plaintiffs that the “removed all
references to Christ” passage in Allegheny County imported a requirement
that legislative prayer be nonsectarian.174
Instead, both courts attempted to reckon with Marsh’s and Allegheny
County’s language as directly as possible, broadly holding that a prayer,
even if sectarian, must not be “exploited to advance or disparage a belief, or
to associate the government with a particular religion.”175 But at this point
the courts part. The District Court deferred to the Town, holding that the
“rotating” nature of the chaplaincy made any affiliation with any one
religion impossible.176 The Second Circuit held that “[w]here the
overwhelming predominance of prayers offered are associated, often in an
explicitly sectarian way, with a particular creed, and where the town takes
172. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (footnote omitted).
173. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n. 14).
174. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 29 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A state-imposed
requirement that all legislative prayers be nondenominational, the Court reasoned, begins to
sound like the establishment of ‘an official or civic religion.’”) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at
590); Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), rev'd 681
F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012).
175. Galloway, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
176. Id. (“Where, as here, a legislature permits a variety of clergy to give invocations,
there is arguably less likelihood that the government could be viewed as advancing a
particular religion, and therefore less concern over the sectarian nature of particular
prayers.”).

THE LAWLESS RULE OF THE NORM

447

no steps to avoid the identification, but rather conveys the impression that
town officials themselves identify with the sectarian prayers and that
residents in attendance are expected to participate in them, a reasonable
objective observer would perceive such an affiliation.”177
Neither the Second Circuit nor the District Court seems to rely on the
endorsement test to decide the case. The District Court, though, steered
clearer of it, avoiding the words “endorsement,” “observer,” and “outsider”
altogether. One senses that the District Court did so deliberately.
Judge Calabresi, writing for the Second Circuit on appeal, does not
make a similar effort. He never invokes an “endorsement test” or an
“endorsement analysis," and there is no citation to Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lynch, for instance. But a few notes nonetheless ring of the
endorsement test. If Judge Calabresi never refers to an “endorsement test,”
he does nonetheless use the word “endorsement:” “We conclude, on the
record before us, that the town's prayer practice must be viewed as an
endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.”178 The “objective
observer” makes an appearance: “We conclude that an objective,
reasonable person would believe that the town's prayer practice had the
effect of affiliating the town with Christianity.”179 Still more reminiscent of
the endorsement test is the Judge’s reference to the feelings of being an
outsider: “People with the best of intentions may be tempted, in the course
of giving a legislative prayer, to convey their views of religious truth, and
thereby run the risk of making others feel like outsiders.”180
As presented by the Second Circuit, moreover, the case revives the
Pinette problem: What should be done if a reasonable, objective observer
would perceive illicit governmental motives that do not, in fact, exist? The
Galloway plaintiffs initially argued that the Town had actively sought out
Christian chaplains and avoided recruiting non-Christian chaplains. The
plaintiffs dropped this claim after failing to prove it in court. The Second
Circuit therefore assumes (I think charitably) that the Town had the “best of
intentions,”181 and no interest at all in affiliating itself with Christianity.182
Having presented the facts in this austere form, the Second Circuit’s
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Galloway, 681 F.3d at 34.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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argument closely resembles an argument that Justice Scalia’s plurality in
Pinette rejected outright and that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence-in-thejudgment embraced only in principle: namely, that observers’ perceptions
can trump policymakers’ intent where religious endorsements are
concerned. Only Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would have given force to
that argument in Pinette.183 To right-leaning critics of the endorsement
test—and among these I would include Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Alito, and almost certainly Roberts (but not myself)—the prospect that a
misperceiving observer might trip the Establishment Clause represents the
anti-endorsement concept in its worst excess, disrupting completely
innocent designs in order to protect the fragile sensibilities of a religiousminority observer who is not only hypersensitive but misinformed as well.
The Second Circuit, without specifically applying the endorsement test,
invites a rebuke to the endorsement test from the Supreme Court’s right
wing. Counsel for the Town explicitly urged the Supreme Court to take this
invitation at the very outset of oral arguments.184
Doing so would require a bit of activism, though, because the Second
Circuit’s opinion does not clearly place the endorsement test at issue. The
opinion is ultimately an attempt to apply Justice Burger’s caveat in Marsh,
which in some ways itself anticipates the endorsement analysis. This much
is true even if Allegheny County’s gloss on Burger’s language is ignored.
Burger in Marsh is concerned with “disparagement,”185 and stresses that the
delegates to the Continental Congress in the founding era did not consider
opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the
government's “official seal of approval on one religious view.”186 There is
not much difference between Judge Calabresi’s use of the word
“endorsement” and Chief Justice Burger’s use of the phrase “seal of
approval.”
Nor does it say much that Judge Calabresi would ask a “reasonable,
objective person” whether the seal of approval had been placed. The law
183. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 129 (2001).
184. “MR. HUNGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:
The court of appeals correctly held that the legislative prayers at issue in this
case were not offensive in the way identified as problematic in Marsh, but the
court then committed legal error by engrafting the endorsement test onto Marsh
as a new barrier to the practice of legislative prayer.”
Galloway Transcript at 1.
185. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).
186. Id. at 792.
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always looks to the reasonable person when it is necessary to interpret a
message.187 And as for the “feel like outsiders” language, which does seem
to draw from the endorsement opinions, it only appears in dicta at the end
of the opinion.
The case is therefore decidable under Marsh. The Second Circuit,
whether or not it interpreted Marsh “correctly,” decided the case under
Marsh. The Supreme Court can decide the case under Marsh. There is no
need to reach endorsement. If the Supreme Court does take on the
endorsement test in Galloway, it will do so purposefully. Any rejection of
the endorsement test in Galloway, even if only in the field of legislative
prayer, can fairly be read as a death warrant on the endorsement test
generally. Yet this much is unremarkable, as the endorsement test has been
a dead man walking for some time. As I have argued above, the
government religious speech cases that reach the Supreme Court are
decided on a voting model. Endorsement has not had the votes since
Justice O’Connor retired in 2005.
More interesting than the fate of endorsement is the future of Marsh
and the test-free approach. Crudely, I see three scenarios, or four, for the
sake of completeness:
Scenario 1: Removal
This scenario represents the negligible likelihood that the Supreme
Court will overrule Marsh and invalidate legislative prayer generally. In
this scenario, the Supreme Court will invalidate the practice of opening
legislative sessions with daily benedictions by religious leaders who may or
may not be on the government’s payroll. Remarkably, this outcome is
simply not a possibility.

187. Moreover, Judge Calabresi says this “reasonable person” must not only be
reasonable, but “objective.” This word, in the past, was used by Justice O’Connor in Pinette
to distinguish the “reasonable person” from any actual person in the community—and
especially from those persons who may be nonadherents. To the extent the “objective,
reasonable person” belongs to the endorsement test, it only belongs to the endorsement test
at its weakest ebb. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O’Connor, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“[T]he endorsement test should [not] focus on the actual perception of
individual observers . . . . Under such an approach, a religious display is necessarily
precluded so long as some passersby would perceive a governmental endorsement thereof.
In my view, however, the endorsement test . . . gauge[s] ‘the ‘objective’ meaning of the
[government’s] statement in the community.”).
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Scenario 2: Containment

This is the boring scenario in which Marsh remains an exception to the
rule in the government speech cases. An exception to which rule is hard to
say with any specificity. We can at least say, though, that Marsh is an
exception to the “rule” that some sort of “test” should be applied besides a
history-and-tradition analysis.
In the “containment” scenario, the Court will have to clarify the
meaning of Chief Justice Burger’s remark to the effect that “[t]he content of
the prayer is not of concern to judges where . . . there is no indication that
the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”188 The Court will also have
to take on Allegheny County’s argument that the Marsh prayers had
satisfied the Establishment Clause only “because the particular chaplain had
‘removed all references to Christ:’ ”189 does it mean prayers must be
“nonsectarian?” And if so, what does “nonsectarian” mean if JudeoChristian prayers are permitted?190 The Court will either wave its hand at
this objection or, more likely, reject the requirement of nonsectarianism
altogether. These questions seem to me impossible to avoid in Galloway;
even ignoring the questions would say a great deal.
In oral argument, Justices Alito and Scalia mockingly challenged
plaintiffs’ counsel to give examples of prayers sufficiently “nonsectarian”
to appeal to polytheists, atheists, and “devil worshippers,” and counsel
admitted that no such prayer can possibly exist.191 Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy, meanwhile, expressed concern that official guidelines
for the content of prayer would create undesirable governmental
entanglements with religion192-- a concern that Justice Kennedy first aired
188. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
189. Id. at 793, n. 14.
190. Justice Scalia would reconcile this tension by privileging monotheism over other
religious orientations: “[T]he Establishment Clause,” he says, “permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout
atheists. The Thanksgiving Proclamation issued by George Washington at the instance of the
First Congress was scrupulously nondenominational—but it was monotheistic. In Marsh v.
Chambers, we said that the fact the particular prayers offered in the Nebraska Legislature
were in the Judeo–Christian tradition, posed no additional problem . . . .” McCreary Cnty.,
545 U.S. at 893–94. See also Colby, supra note 10.
191. Galloway Transcript at 31–34.
192. Id. at 34–35. Counsel for plaintiff had an effective if impatient answer to Justice
Kennedy’s concerns near the end of his time:
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years ago in Lee v. Weisman.193 These comments, together with past
history, suggest that a majority of the Court does not see a nonsectarianism
requirement in Marsh.
More avoidable than the sectarianism point is the question of why
legislative prayer should be treated differently from other government
religious speech. But assuming that there is a “why” probably gives Marsh
too much credit. My own take is that the Marsh “exception” has no
principled basis whatsoever. The case is “unique” because the Court’s
majority wanted to reach a certain result and the controlling case law made
that result difficult to reach. Marsh was an uninspired, ham-handed
strategy to cope with the problem. And to make things worse, the opinion’s
sloppy drafting added unintended complexity—the “exploitation” remark,
for instance194—that we must today honor as purposeful nuance.
All of this being said, the Court may take Galloway as an opportunity
to give Marsh’s exceptional status some sort of a theoretical backing. But
there is no need for it to do so.
Scenario 3: Incorporation
The easiest and most formal way for the Court to distinguish the
school-prayer cases of Engel, Schempp, Lee, and Doe is by resort to Marsh
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, I'm serious about this. This involves government
very heavily in religion.
MR. LAYCOCK: Well, government became very heavily involved in religion
when we decided there could be prayers to open legislative sessions. Marsh is
the source of government involvement in religion. And now the question is how
to manage the problems that arise from that.
Id. at 54.
193.
“Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the ‘Guidelines for
Civic Occasions,’ and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian.
Through these means the principal directed and controlled the content of the
prayers. Even if the only sanction for ignoring the instructions were that the
rabbi would not be invited back, we think no religious representative who
valued his or her continued reputation and effectiveness in the community
would incur the State's displeasure in this regard. It is a cornerstone principle of
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government, and that is what
the school officials attempted to do.”
Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (citation omitted).
194. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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and the “exceptional” status of legislative prayer—see Scenario 1. But
Justice Kennedy, in Doe, made a more substantive distinction, arguing that
school prayer is coercive in a way that legislative prayer, or some forms of
legislative prayer, are not.195 Marsh itself made this point,196 and counsel
for the Town stressed it heavily in oral argument.197
If a majority of the Court is interested in advancing the anti-coercion
rationale as a grand unified theory of the Establishment Clause, it can easily
explain Marsh as a decision resting on anti-coercion principles. This is
possible under either variant of coercion theory: Justice Kennedy’s, which
considers certain psychological pressures to be impermissibly coercive,198
as well as Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s, which would not.199
At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued with some force that the
Town had violated at least Justice Kennedy’s broad version of the coercion
test: “there's no doubt that before you stand up to ask for relief from a
governing body, you don't want to offend that body. Adults are subject to
coercion here. And --and no competent attorney would tell his client, it
doesn't matter whether you visibly dissent from the prayer or not. You try to
have your client make a good impression.”200 The argument for
unconstitutional coercion in Galloway seems at least as strong as in, say,
Doe, which found coercion in a student-led prayer at a football game.201 If
plaintiffs win in Galloway, it is far more likely to be on coercion than
sectarianism grounds. A victory for plaintiffs therefore almost certainly
means that the Court has subordinated Marsh to the coercion test.
Scenario 4: Expansion
In this scenario, the Court decides Galloway under Marsh while
dropping hints that the history-and-tradition rationale is in some form a
sound approach to Establishment Clause problems unrelated to legislative
prayer. Recall that in Lynch v. Donnelly, Chief Justice Burger seemed
poised to expand Marsh’s history-and-tradition rationale beyond Marsh.
The Chief Justice’s majority opinion devoted a section of the analysis to
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596–97 (1992).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
Galloway Argument at 10, 23–4.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
See id. at 636–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Galloway Transcript at 47.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290.
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Marsh, concluding that “it would be difficult to identify a more striking
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by the Framers”
than legislative prayer.202 This discussion laid the groundwork for the
“normalcy checking” I criticize above, in which all “acknowledgements” of
religion less extreme than legislative prayer must be permissible under the
establishment clause.203 I have explained above that I believe a great deal
of this normalcy checking goes on under the guise of the endorsement test
and so on. But as a formal matter, Marsh has been thought of for some
time as limited to its facts rather than as offering an all-purpose approach.
Things could easily have been different, though, under a Court as
conservatively composed as the one we have today. After all, the effort to
contain Marsh has always come from the Court’s left. It was Justice
Brennan, recall, whose dissent in Marsh first characterized it as a narrowly
written opinion.204 Justice Brennan objected bitterly in Lynch to Chief
Justice Burger’s attempt to expand Marsh beyond the boundary Justice
Brennan had drawn for it in his Marsh dissent.205 The five-vote hegemony
of the endorsement test from Allegheny County until Justice O’Connor’s
retirement may well be all that prevented Marsh from flourishing—
metastasizing is probably a better word—into a landmark case.
There is an appetite to expand the Marsh analysis. Critics of
endorsement have put a lot of weight on Marsh-like “history and tradition”
arguments over the years.206 Justice Kennedy, for instance, dissenting in
Allegheny County and citing Marsh,207 urged that “[w]hatever test we
choose to apply must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries old
but also any other practices with no greater potential for an establishment of
religion… A test for implementing the protections of the Establishment
202. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984).
203. See supra note 56.
204. Nothing to see here, Justice Brennan seems to say: “The Court today has written a
narrow and, on the whole, careful opinion. In effect, the Court holds that officially
sponsored legislative prayer, primarily on account of its ‘unique history,’ is generally
exempted from the First Amendment's prohibition against “the establishment of religion.”
The Court's opinion is consistent with dictum in at least one of our prior decisions, and its
limited rationale should pose little threat to the overall fate of the Establishment Clause.”
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715–26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–90 (2005) (detailing the
“unbroken history” of religious “acknowledgments” in government).
207. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding
traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.”
Outside the Court, as well, and sometimes even outside the
Establishment Clause context, litigants have tried to turn Marsh’s
normalcy-check logic to their advantage.208 Defenders of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA),209 for instance, quoted Marsh in their brief before
the Supreme Court: “In enacting DOMA and [denying Federal recognition
to state-sanctioned same-sex marriages], Congress recognized that the
institution of marriage as between a man and a woman is, to borrow this
Court's words from [Marsh], ‘deeply embedded in the history and tradition
of this country’ and ‘has become part of the fabric of our society.’”210 The
analogy makes sense. DOMA, much like the Town of Greece’s prayer
time, is a mean and irrational policy enacted only to pander at the expense
of an historically and traditionally disfavored minority. Such policies can
always find comfort and inspiration in Marsh.
Conclusion
In this Article, I have spent a good deal of space detailing the various
ways that Supreme Court Justices avoid acknowledging the “normalcy
checks” that govern so much of the case law of religiously-themed public
displays. I have focused most, but not all, of my criticism on Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test. It is an obvious target for a couple of
reasons. First, in the hands of a swing-vote Justice such as O’Connor, the
endorsement test can be manipulated to produce almost any outcome
(which, of course, is true of Justice Kennedy’s “coercion test” as well).
208. Petition of Elk Grove Unified School Dist. for cert. at 15, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(“[T]he reference to God in the Pledge is interwoven into the ‘fabric of our society.’ Thus,
utilizing a flexible test such as Marsh, when considered in conjunction with historical
references to God and the affirmations of this Court, the Pledge does not violate the
Establishment Clause.”) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792); Brief Amicus Curiae of the
National Legal Foundation in support of Petitioners at 2, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700
(2010) (“[T]he longstanding use of Latin crosses as memorials to the dead . . . protects the
use of such crosses from constitutional attack. When a memorial, such as the Cross, is
‘deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country’ and has ‘become part of the
fabric of our society,’ it should be afforded great deference as to its constitutionality.”)
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
209. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
210. Brief of Respondent at 41, United States of America v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675
(2013).
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Second, the rationale for the endorsement test depends on what at least
sounds like an unusually soft harm: namely, a feeling of exclusion. Not a
religious oath or a special tax, but just a sense of insult. But the law rarely
recognizes claims based entirely on this kind of harm.211 Particularly telling
is the failure of the “Confederate flag” litigation, in which black plaintiffs
challenged on Equal Protection grounds the continuing incorporation of the
Confederate battle flag into official state insignia. 212 The theory behind
such a challenge has much in common with the theory behind, for instance,
a Ten Commandments challenge. 213 Yet if anything, one would expect the
Confederate flag plaintiffs to have a much stronger case than the Ten
Commandments plaintiffs. After all, it is hard to imagine how a state could
possibly send a minority group a more stigmatizing message.
The endorsement test, in sum, has serious weaknesses. The same can
be said for the coercion test. But we should not be surprised that the
Court’s efforts to answer the question of government religious speech are
so awkward. For these controversies are political matters. They do not
lend themselves well to legal reasoning. It is the Court’s unhappy lot under
the First Amendment to hear these questions and attempt to resolve them
through something resembling a legal analysis. The endorsement test and
the coercion test fail, but they represent an attempt. Marsh, on the other
hand, does not even try. If only for that reason, Marsh must not grow from
the exception to the rule. It is the work of a court so exasperated with the
concerns of a religious-minority claimant that it cannot be bothered to cite
the rules before jumping its preferred outcome. The Establishment Clause,
however mysterious, must at least require better than that.

211. The law of negligence traditionally requires a physical impact if the plaintiff is to
recover emotional distress damages. Intentional tort claims for emotional distress damages
tend to require something “extra,” generally some sort of malice, and the emotional harms
must be extreme. Contract law does not formally award compensation for emotional
distress. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 49 (2013).
212. See Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997) (rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc denied 127 F.3d 42) (cert. denied 523 U.S. 1011); N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt,
891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
213. See James Forman Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag From
Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505 (1991); L. Darnell Weeden, How to Establish
Flying the Confederate Flag with the State As Sponsor Violates the Equal Protection Clause,
34 AKRON L. REV. 521 (2001); I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121 (2004).

